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As scientists and practitioners, behavior analysts must make frequent decisions that affect many
lives. Scientific principles have been our guide as we work to promote effective action across
a broad spectrum of cultural practices. Yet scientific principles alone may not be sufficient to
guide our decision making in cases with potentially conflicting outcomes. In such cases, values
function as guides to work through ethical conflicts. We will examine two ethical systems,
radical behaviorism and functional contextualism, from which to consider the role of values in
behavior analysis, and discuss potential concerns. Finally, we propose philosophical
pragmatism, focusing on John Dewey’s notions of community and dialogue, as a tradition
that can help behavior analysts to integrate talk about values and scientific practices in ethical
decision making.
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As scientists and practitioners,
behavior analysts must make fre-
quent decisions that affect others.
Implicit in our practices are numer-
ous assumptions about the welfare of
those we serve and how to best ensure
it. Our scientific tradition has yielded
a powerful behavioral technology,
and our fields of application are ever
expanding. In this tradition, scientific
principles have been our guide to best
practice. Yet scientific principles
alone may not be sufficient to guide
our decisions in situations with po-
tentially conflicting outcomes. In
such cases, values function as guides
to action and play a key role in
helping us work through ethical
quandaries. If it is true that operating
without a lucid set of guiding princi-
ples can bring about grave conse-
quences (Prilleltensky, 1997), then it
is in our best interest to have
a working understanding of ethical
systems that support values-based
decision making in behavior-analytic
practices. To this end, we will con-
sider two separate philosophical ap-
proaches to behavior-analytic science
each with its own ethically relevant
consequences. From there, we will
explore the relationship between val-
ues and scientific decision making
from the tenets in each case. Specif-
ically, we will examine the reaches
and limitations of both systems in
guiding decision making within situa-
tions involving value conflicts and
ethical dilemmas. Finally, we will
turn to philosophical pragmatism,
focusing on the work of John Dewey,
as a tradition that may help behavior
analysts build a coherent knowledge
and ethical system.
The first philosophical approach we
will discuss is B. F. Skinner’s radical
behaviorism, which has been the
philosophical framework of behav-
ior-analytic science for over 60 years.
In his treatment of values, Skinner
dismisses the distinctions made by
many philosophers between values
and facts. In Skinner’s naturalistic
ethics, survival emerges as the ulti-
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mate value and criterion by which to
assess the worth of cultures and
individual cultural practices. This
leads to a question of practical im-
portance, that is, can Skinner’s ethical
system provide a guide to action for
scientists, particularly in situations
with potentially conflicting outcomes?
We review the work of two critics
from within our own field who argue
that Skinner’s system cannot provide
adequate guidelines for resolving eth-
ical problems. Staddon (2004) con-
siders research on smoking to illus-
trate and argues that Skinner’s system
requires science to function beyond its
scope, making it unworkable. Zuriff
(1987), on the other hand, takes issue
with Skinner’s construction of values
and concludes that his naturalistic
ethics cannot adequately justify sur-
vivability as a criterion to resolve
ethical problems.
Next we review contextualism,
a philosophical framework originally
proposed by Pepper (1942) and ad-
vanced as a worldview for behavior
analysis by Hayes (1993). It is within
this philosophical framework that re-
lational frame theory (RFT) (Hayes,
Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001) has
emerged as an increasingly popular
functional analytic account of lan-
guage and cognitive phenomena.
Within contextualism the personal
values of the scientist are considered
to be the basis for the development of
scientific goals. Furthermore, person-
al values are indefensible and entitled
to remain private, and pragmatic
truth is established when the scientist’s
analytic goals are reached. In conflict
situations, therefore, the fulfillment of
the scientist’s value-based personal
goals is the criterion by which to
assess the worth of the scientific
practice. The scientist, in turn, is not
in principle accountable to others in
the scientific or broader community.
This explicit stance on the scientist’s
accountability is reminiscent of the
form of pragmatism developed by
Machiavelli (1515/1947). Thus, we
will consider some parallels between
Machiavellian and contextualistic
pragmatism and discuss moral con-
siderations that may limit the adequa-
cy of contextualism in guiding scien-
tific decision making in difficult cases.
The potential confluence of values
and scientific decision making can be
clearly depicted with a case study
from feminist science. One defining
aspect of feminist science is its un-
derstanding of scientific activity as
political activity, and its willingness
to explicitly allow political values to
help guide choices when faced with
conflict situations. We discuss the
work of biologists Longino and Doell
(1983) to illustrate how values may be
used as guides to action in scientific
decision making when they are made
explicit, and scientific knowing is
conceived as participating in a social
context. This case study will lead to
the final section of the paper in which
we consider the philosophical prag-
matism of Dewey, whose work we
believe is particularly relevant for our
behavior-analytic community. For
example, Dewey’s approach to rela-
tivism and pragmatic truth, his re-
liance on scientific knowing, and his
orienting assumptions about commu-
nity and the communal aspects of
inquiry can enrich our own discus-
sions concerning the criteria we will
use to develop ethical principles for
ourselves. What we need, we believe,
is serious and open dialogue on how
we, as a community, can make valued
ethical decisions and use them as
guides to scientific action.
RADICAL BEHAVIORISM
B. F. Skinner’s treatment of values
begins with an observation about
verbal behavior. Skinner (1971) tells
us that ‘‘What a given group calls
[italics added] ‘good’ is a fact: It is
what members of the group find
reinforcing’’ (p. 122). Moreover, he
suggests that the ‘‘reinforcers that
appear in the contingencies [of a cul-
ture] are its ‘values’ ’’ (p. 121). Thus,
‘‘any list of values is a list of re-
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inforcers’’ (1956, p. 35). The items on
a list of values can be classified under
three headings: personal good, owing
to our biological susceptibility and
genetic endowment; the good of
others, derived from social reinforce-
ment for positive social behavior; and
the good of the culture, and the
measures the culture uses to induce
its members to work for its survival.
At the center of B. F. Skinner’s
(1956) analysis of values is his asser-
tion that survival emerges as the
ultimate value by which to assess
the worth of a culture. Survival is the
‘‘ultimate criterion’’ (p. 36), and he
compares the evolution of a culture
with that of a species. Skinner (1971)
described it this way:
A culture corresponds to a species. We
describe it by listing many of its practices, as
we describe a species by listing many of its
anatomical features. Two or more cultures
may share a practice, as two or more species
may share an anatomical feature. The prac-
tices of a culture, like the characteristics of
a species, are carried by its members, who
transmit them to other members. … A culture,
like a species, is selected by its adaptation to
an environment: to the extent that it helps its
members to get what they need and avoid
what is dangerous, it helps them to survive
and transmit the culture. (p. 123)
Although he posits survival as the
criterion according to which a given
culture is to be evaluated, he ac-
knowledges that survival value is
a difficult criterion for many to
accept partly because it is often in
direct conflict with traditional values.
For example, he wrote,
There are circumstances under which a group
is more likely to survive if it is not happy, or
under which it will survive only if large
numbers of its members submit to slavery.
… In order to accept survival as a criterion in
judging a culture, it thus appears to be
necessary to abandon such principles as
happiness, freedom, and virtue. … These
difficulties appear to explain why those that
are accustomed to the traditional values
hesitate to accept survival as an alternative.
We have no reason to urge them to do so. We
need not say that anyone chooses survival as
a criterion according to which a cultural
practice is to be evaluated. Human behavior
does not depend upon the prior choice of any
value. (1953, p. 432).
Thus, survival is a measure of effective
action taken by a culture. In effect,
Skinner applies a pragmatic truth
criterion to assess a culture’s worth.
So, for example, we may say that
a liberal democracy and an Islamic
theocracy are both examples of sur-
vival-worthy cultures due to cultural
practices that have collectively led to
effective action in each case. Some
may want to argue that the effective
cultural practices that one or both of
these forms of government rely on for
survival are undesirable, in the same
sense that slavery is undesirable. Such
concerns, however true, are irrelevant
if the criterion of goodness is the
Skinnerian one: ‘‘A culture which for
any reason induces its members to
work for its survival is more likely to
survive’’ (1971, p. 137). He recognizes
this position as cultural relativism and
spells out its implications that ‘‘Each
culture has its own set of goods, and
what is good in one culture may not
be good in another’’ (p. 122).
One can see that B. F. Skinner’s
pragmatic approach to understand-
ing truth (what works) and values
(reinforcers) dismisses traditional no-
tions that they can be understood as
universally valid and arising from the
power of a higher authority in the
metaphysical sense, or as a private
(rational) matter. According to Rorty
(1999), ‘‘for pragmatists … there is
no distinction of kind between what
is useful and what is right and
[therefore] no distinction between
facts and values’’ (p. 73). Although
Rorty was referring to the philosophy
of John Dewey in this passage, his
comments apply equally well to
radical behaviorism. For Skinner,
value-laden terms, such as good,
function as tacts for reinforcers.
Given that reinforcers are always
functionally defined, it follows that
values too may be understood func-
tionally rather than as matters of
metaphysics.
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B. F. Skinner’s Naturalistic Ethics
In developing a naturalistic ethic,
Skinner distinguished clearly between
what ‘‘ought’’ to be the case (i.e.,
evaluations) and what ‘‘is’’ the case
(i.e., descriptions). Skinner (1953)
recognized that ‘‘The word ‘should’
brings us into the familiar realm of
the value judgment’’ (p. 428). He did
not, however, dismiss value judg-
ments but rather embraced them as
part of the subject matter of a science
of behavior. According to Skinner, it
is not true that statements containing
should or ought have no place in
scientific discourse. However, it is
important to provide translations of
value statements in functional terms
in order to reveal the relevant con-
tingencies of reinforcement.
Day (1977) explained Skinner’s
ethics in the following way. Skinner’s
analysis of ethical injunctions involv-
ing statements of ‘‘ought’’ and
‘‘should’’ aims to peel away normative
statements, including social norms,
rules of conduct, and moral laws, to
uncover the relevant controlling con-
tingencies that are subtly embedded in
them. So, for example, embedded in
the statement ‘‘one should follow the
rules of traffic’’ are indirect references
to prevailing controlling contingencies
(e.g., police are present and enforce the
rules and keep the public safe) perti-
nent to the listener’s behavior (e.g., if
you do not follow traffic laws you will
get a ticket or have an accident). Thus,
because normative statements tact
standards based on factual claims, we
can bring evidence to bear on them
(e.g., we have evidence of how the
police operate to enforce traffic rules
and data to show number of tickets
and traffic accidents).
Thus we can see that Skinner’s
claim that science can contribute to
the assessment of ethical matters
relies on the evidence we can offer
to justify cultural standards and the
factual statements on which they are
based (see Day, 1977, for an extended
discussion). Skinner (1956) believed
that such analyses take on particular
importance in the context of cultural
design and the evaluation of cultural
practices. According to Skinner, sci-
ence is in the best position to ‘‘en-
abl[e] us to predict the survival value
of cultural practices’’ (p. 36).
Can B. F. Skinner’s Naturalistic
Ethics Provide a Guide to Action?
Critics within the field of behavior
analysis (e.g., Staddon, 2004; Zuriff,
1987) have argued that Skinner’s
naturalistic ethics cannot deliver
what it promises because it (a)
requires science to function beyond
its scope; (b) does not provide us with
practical guidance, particularly in
deciding difficult cases; and (c) can-
not adequately justify survivability as
a criterion to resolve ethical prob-
lems. We will now examine each of
these claims in more detail.
Staddon (2004) argues that Skin-
ner’s ethics requires science to func-
tion beyond its scope and does not
provide practical guidance when we
consider difficult cases. He begins by
questioning the validity of Skinner’s
presupposition that any given society
can actually define what constitutes
cultural fitness for the future. This
would require reliable knowledge of
the future, which Staddon argues is
not fully achievable given the un-
predictable nature of evolution. He
then challenges Skinner’s assertion
that a scientific community can ac-
curately predict the survival value of
specific cultural practices and recom-
mend best practices for the future.
‘‘Evolution is inherently unpredict-
able. Some practices whose benefits
cannot be proved might nevertheless
turn out to be good for the survival
of the culture [whereas] others that
seem to be good might turn out to
be bad’’ (2004, p. 241). To illus-
trate, he considers smoking and its
health hazards, citing statistics in
the New York Times (Winter, 2001)
from a recent study for the Czech
Republic sponsored by the Philip
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Morris Company. It reported that
in a socialist economy in which
the state must pay health care,
housing expenses, and pensions,
a population of smokers will be less
costly to the state with benefit
amounts of $1,227 per death. Stad-
don speculates that, ‘‘perhaps a soci-
ety that encourages smoking—which
yields a generally short but produc-
tive life—will be more successful in
the long run than one that dis-
courages smoking and has to put up
with a lot of unproductive [old]
people’’ (p. 239). Perhaps the same
justification can be used to argue
against (or for) stem cell research. If
survival is deemed the ultimate crite-
rion of value, then science cannot
predict which values are appropriate
because it cannot foresee which
values will better aid survival of the
culture.
Zuriff’s (1987) analysis of Skin-
ner’s naturalistic ethics leads him to
conclude that it cannot adequately
justify survivability as a criterion to
resolve ethical problems. Before con-
sidering Zuriff’s case, let us briefly
recall Skinner’s position. Skinner
argued that science can contribute
to the assessment of ethical matters
because it relies on obtainable empir-
ical evidence that can be used to
justify our factual claims. As an
example, we might advance the fol-
lowing injunction about the role of
cultural survival as a value: ‘‘Scien-
tists should apply cultural survivabil-
ity as a criterion to resolve difficult
ethical cases and make recommenda-
tions for future practices.’’ Zuriff,
however, takes issue with the idea
that this injunction can be retained
using functional analysis. Specifical-
ly, Zuriff points to Skinner’s (1971)
treatment of values that begins with
an observation about how people use
the word good in everyday talk. In
Skinner’s words, ‘‘effective reinforc-
ers are a matter of observation and
cannot be disputed. What a given
group calls ‘good’ is a fact: it is what
members of the group find reinfor-
cing’’ (p. 122). Zuriff argues that with
this observation ’’Skinner takes our
normal use of the word ‘good’ as
definitive and as the basis for his
notion of good’’ (p. 310). Zuriff then
examines the implications of the
verbal relations established by Skin-
ner in arguing that ethical injunctions
can be substantiated. To understand
Zuriff’s argument, let us represent
Skinner’s position in terms of equiv-
alence relations (i.e., if A 5 B and B
5 C then A 5 C). Using standard
and familiar equivalence nomencla-
ture, we may refer to good as A,
reinforcers as B, and values as C.
Thus, from Skinner’s perspective, A
5 B (i.e., good 5 reinforcers), and B
5 C (i.e., reinforcers 5 values). Now
we recall that when we speak of
reinforcers we are tacting events that
enter into empirically observable
relations. These relations are matters
of fact because we must be able to
observe the effects and functions of
reinforcers in order to identify them
as such. Thus, for Skinner, the
equivalence that is derived between
good and values (i.e., A 5 C) can be
scientifically determined and ques-
tions of values can be settled empir-
ically by science.
Zuriff (1987) argues that Skinner’s
construction is flawed. Specifically, if
what we call good (A) is equivalent to
our values (C), we should be able to
offer empirical evidence of reinfor-
cing functions (B) in order to obtain
our equivalence relation. Moreover,
if we are prepared to offer recom-
mendations about what course of
action we ‘‘should’’ or ‘‘ought’’ to
take in a particular case, then as
behaviorists, we should also be pre-
pared to offer empirical evidence of
reinforcing contingencies that bear
on the recommendation as justifica-
tion for these (Skinner, 1953; see also
Day, 1977; Leigland, 1993). Howev-
er, because survival for survival’s
sake is not equivalent to the tact
‘‘good’’ (A) for many groups, we will
lack empirical evidence that cultural
survival operates as a reinforcer (B)
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in our analysis of the controlling
contingencies that operate for said
groups. We would therefore not be
warranted in speaking of cultural
survival as a value (C). In contrast
to Skinner and his followers, such
groups constitute distinct verbal com-
munities. Zuriff describes these as
distinct values communities whose
disagreement with Skinner is ‘‘not
over matters of fact … [and] science
cannot appeal to survival as a criteri-
on to decide among differing points
of view because survivability is pre-
cisely what is at issue.’’ Therefore,
Zuriff concludes that Skinner’s ‘‘nat-
uralist ethics based on empirical
observations of behavior cannot jus-
tify survivability as a criterion to
resolve ethical problems’’ (p. 311).
The critiques offered by Staddon
(2004) and Zuriff (1987) converge on
the admonition that in conflict situa-
tions, Skinner’s naturalistic ethics do
not provide adequate guidelines for
how to go about making decisions to
maximize the culture’s chances of
survival. The first argument involves
the reaches of science (Staddon).
Specifically, whereas Skinner entrusts
science with the responsibility to
develop the analytic strategies that
will allow us to predict the survival
values of cultural practices, Staddon
reminds us that ‘‘evolution is inher-
ently unpredictable’’ (p. 241). Thus,
we may not be able to fully ascertain
potential benefits of objectionable
practices or the long-term fallout of
ones that seem advantageous. The
second argument takes issue with the
inherent logic in Skinner’s formula-
tion (Zuriff). Skinner takes existing
verbal behavior (what members of
a group call good 5 reinforcers 5
values) as the initial premise of
his position. Interestingly, Skinner
(1971) acknowledges that ‘‘each cul-
ture has its own set of goods, and
what is good in one culture may not
be good in another. To recognize this
is to take the position of ‘cultural
relativism’ ’’ (p. 122). Because what
different groups call good varies, we
cannot distill strict rules for choosing
among goods. Without such rules,
Skinner’s formulation can give ‘‘suf-
ficient but not necessary conditions
for the good, and thus fails to tell us
what we ought to do’’ (Zuriff, p. 313)
to work towards optimal cultural
fitness.
The foregoing conclusions hold
true not only for the culture at large
but also for the subculture of scien-
tists who adhere to a pragmatic goal
orientation and effective action as
a truth criterion in establishing the
validity of scientific beliefs. An in-
teresting question thus arises: how do
scientists choose those specific cul-
tural practices that are to be the
subject of inquiry regarding their
utility in the long-term survival of
the culture? More specifically, if, as
Skinner suggests, contingencies of
human survival will control the be-
havior of scientists in the long run,
then what contingencies control sci-
entific behavior in the short term?
Skinner (1961) admits that ‘‘long-
term consequences are usually not
obvious, and there is little induce-
ment to pay any attention to them’’
(p. 46). Zuriff (1985) suggests that in
the short term, scientists will adopt
whatever topics of study they in-
dividually find most rewarding. In
effect, economic, social, and political
contingencies will undoubtedly factor
into the scientist’s decision-making
process (see also Fawcett, 1991;
Glenn, 1988). Most, if not all, behav-
ior analysts may indeed function with
a view to advancing practices that are
in the long-term interest of the
culture, but the rules of evidence of
scientific inquiry do not prescribe
checks and balances for them to do
so. Indeed, Zuriff noted that lacking
agreement on goals, purposes, and
definitions of effectiveness, contro-
versies among individuals over best
practices are in part disagreements
over values. However, implicating
personal values as contingencies for
scientific activity was untenable for
Skinner. In his words, ‘‘I cannot
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agree that the practice of science
requires a priori decision about goals
or a prior choice of values …
[because] any list of values is a list
of reinforcers’’ (1956, p. 35). Al-
though a functional analysis of values
in terms of reinforcers does indeed
seem plausible, a growing number of
behavior analysts have chosen to
retain personal values as a core
concept of their scientific practice.
Within this particular group, person-
al values are taken as a starting point
for scientific inquiry; Skinner’s re-
quirement for a functional analysis of
values in terms of reinforcers is
explicitly rejected. This is known as
contextualism, and it is our next
point of discussion.
CONTEXTUALISM
Hayes (1993) noted certain vague-
ness in Skinner’s and other pragma-
tists’ references to effective action. He
interpreted this vagueness as indica-
tive of dogmatism within radical
behaviorism. More specifically, ac-
cording to Hayes, dogmatism can be
avoided by the clear exposition of
one’s a priori analytic goals. When
the scientist states explicit goals
ahead of the analysis, he or she
creates a standard against which to
assess the effectiveness of the meth-
odology. When explicit a priori goals
are not forthcoming, the scientist
necessarily offers the scientific truth
claim in the absence of a qualifying
purpose of analysis and a means for
assessing the relevant methodology’s
effectiveness. Thus, the claim is dog-
matic and undermines pragmatism
itself. For Hayes, the nondogmatic
pragmatists recognize that their ana-
lytic goals are themselves arbitrary
and fundamentally indefensible. In
effect, the purposes of any given
analysis are ultimately personal and
subjective. Hayes therefore proposed
that behavior analysis is better char-
acterized by Pepper’s (1942) contex-
tualism than by traditional American
pragmatism (see also Hayes &
Brownstein, 1986; Hayes, Hayes, &
Reese, 1988; Morris, 1998).
Contextualists adopt a pragmatic
stance on truth. The root metaphor
of contextualism is the act in context.
According to Pepper (1942), acts
have a satisfaction in their comple-
tion (e.g., going to the train station),
and this satisfaction applies equally
to the observer and the observed. In
effect, scientific analyses also have
desired consequences that can be
satisfied, and herein lies the truth
criterion of contextualism—the
achievement of desired consequences
or valued ends.
One of the terms that Pepper
(1942) uses to describe the truth
criterion of contextualism is success-
ful working. Successful working is an
outcome concept that refers to reach-
ing a goal or producing a desirable
consequence to action. The terms
goal, purpose, and desirable conse-
quence all suggest that the important
issue is not simply the presence or
absence of any consequences, but the
degree to which the consequence
produced was part of the preanalyti-
cally specified outcome (Hayes,
1993). In other words, the pragmatic
truth criterion is not foundational in
contextualism, but the goals of the
analyst are (Barnes & Roche, 1997).
By allowing the scientist to evaluate
the utility of a particular investigative
methodology, the truth criterion is
applied always in the service of
moving him or her in the direction
of the valued ends.
It is important to understand that
in contextualism, ultimate goals can-
not themselves be justified—they may
only be stated. The attempt to justify
a goal requires the specification of yet
another more global goal. Moreover,
any attempt to demonstrate the value
of a goal via successful working
requires yet another analytic goal.
Thus, only local goals can be justi-
fied, and the choice of an ultimate
analytic goal is taken to be a personal
rather than an ontological issue.
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Contextualists argue, therefore, that
the use of a goal in contextualism
cannot be dogmatic.
There are an infinite number of
valued ends towards which the ana-
lyst may move. Hayes (1993) pro-
vides the following examples: to
experience the harmony of events;
to experience connections among
events; to produce a consistency of
beliefs; to understand and make sense
of the world; to feel personally
satisfied; to manipulate and control
phenomena; to survive as a species,
individual, or culture; to look in-
telligent; to speak nonsense; to get
put into a mental hospital.
Once the behavior analyst has
chosen a goal, he or she can assess
the degree to which analytic practices
have moved him or her towards that
goal in the past and how likely they
are to do so in the future. Implicit
goals will not serve as well because
post hoc narratives can always be
constructed that make sense of any
given outcome. Thus, only explicit
goals can make successful working
a trustworthy guide to analysis.
Contextualism appears to repre-
sent an extreme form of relativism.
Indeed, the parallels between contex-
tualistic behavior analysis and post-
modernist critique have been noted
(Roche & Barnes-Holmes, 2003), and
the relativism of this philosophical
position is underscored by the ac-
ceptability of an infinite range of
purposes of analyses. Interestingly,
these purposes can even be used
to justify adopting epistemological
strategies that are apparently anti-
thetical to contextualism itself (e.g.,
mechanism; see Barnes & Roche,
1994).
Hayes (1993) has described two
distinct forms of contextualism, de-
scriptive and functional. Both involve
treating personal goals and values as
a priori starting points for analysis.
However, the behavior analyst is not
obligated to share those goals pub-
licly as a necessary condition of
analysis in either case. Whereas in
descriptive contextualism the analyst
need not specify observable criteria of
successful analytic outcome, in func-
tional contextualism, as in radical
behaviorism, the analyst is required
to identify operational dependent
measures that may be used to assess
the truth of a scientific claim. For the
purposes of our discussion on science
and values, we will focus primarily on
functional contextualism.
Functional contextualism can be
characterized as a radically pragmatic
version of Pepper’s (1942) contextu-
alism and is associated with theoret-
ical movements such as relational
frame theory (RFT; Hayes et al.,
2001) and acceptance and commit-
ment therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl,
& Wilson, 1999). It is important to
note that the functional contextual-
ism proposed by Hayes (1993) is also
distinct from the pragmatism of
William James, Dewey, and Peirce.
In contrast to American pragma-
tism, functional contextualism es-
capes dogmatism by introducing
a central role for personal values.
However, this cannot be done with-
out adopting a thoroughly relativistic
stance on truth. It is within the
context of this thoroughly relativistic
position that concerns may arise over
the value of the system itself for the
wider community. First, this truth
criterion creates an epistemological
gulf between contextualists and non-
contextualists such that research find-
ings and even methodologies cannot
be easily compared (see Barnes-
Holmes, 2000). This raises questions
about how radical behaviorists and
contextualists can assess the value of
each other’s work and communicate
on those matters meaningfully. This
issue is not merely academic: Prom-
inent theoretical positions such as
RFT and ACT require proponents to
be versed in contextualism. Indeed, it
is argued that it may not even be
possible to understand these theoret-
ical positions without adopting a
contextualist philosophy (see Barnes-
Holmes & Barnes-Holmes, 2000;
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Hayes et al., 1999). Of course, it
might be argued that differing philo-
sophical standpoints within any sci-
entific community necessarily lead to
internal communication rifts. Never-
theless, it merits consideration that
the rise of contextualism heralds such
a rift within what might be described
as an already fledgling domain within
the wider psychological community.
Second, the radical relativism of
functional contextualism precludes
the possibility of wide and meaning-
ful discussion on the moral character
of a given research program or
knowledge claim. More specifically,
because personal values are indefen-
sible, the contextualist may remain
silent when questioned about the
value of a given research program
or agenda (or he or she may not if
speaking serves some other private or
public personal goal). Obviously, this
state of affairs makes moral assess-
ment of the contextualist’s agenda
difficult if not impossible, except by
reference to the observable conse-
quences of research or practice once
they have already been produced. Of
course, some may argue that all
science ultimately and rightfully takes
place in a moral vacuum. The impor-
tant point, however, is that func-
tional contextualism as a worldview
explicitly declares its immunity to
moral responsibility to others by
insisting that personal values are the
only qualifiers for scientific activity
and knowledge claims (see Barnes &
Roche, 1997; Hayes, 1993). Such
moral relativism may be of concern
to some readers. However, the public
declaration on the personal nature of
contextualism’s truth criteria may
actually serve to safeguard against
its misuse by alerting the community
to the nature of the value system
itself. In effect, such openness allows
the behavioral community to make
joint decisions on the moral character
of a research program with the added
knowledge of the relevant research-
ers’ stance on moral accountability.
Similarly, Skinner also suggested that
scientific practices cannot be ulti-
mately morally assessed. However,
by nominating the survival value of
a given scientific practice as a truth
criterion for that practice, he pro-
vided the community with an objec-
tive index by which to publicly assess
the moral character of any scientific
endeavor, at least from a radical
behaviorist perspective.
It is of course the case that con-
textualists may take a moral position,
declare that position publicly, and
behave in as morally upstanding
a way as any other citizen. It is also
the case that scientists of other persua-
sions may be free to behave immorally
while conducting research and making
knowledge claims. In fact, it could be
argued that contextualism actually
increases our focus on ethical issues
by making considerations of the long-
term effect of scientific activity central
to the system itself. In this way, the
focus on ultimate personal goals may
be seen as a call to enlightenment that
will likely benefit the whole community
in the long term. Nevertheless, func-
tional contextualism adopts an explicit
stance on moral accountability to
others that merits discussion by the
wider behavior-analytic community.
As an illustration of the need for such
a discussion, we will consider a form of
pragmatism developed by Machiavelli
that adopts a stance on moral account-
ability that appears, at least at face
value, to be similar to the functional
contextualist stance. Although Machi-
avellianism and functional contextual-
ism are not to be equated, the moral
considerations to be made regarding
both have much in common.
Machiavelli and Moral Accountability
Machiavelli devised a loosely prag-
matic philosophy of political behav-
ior that could be used equally for
good or evil, however conceived.
Nevertheless, the very moral relativ-
ism of the position has concerned the
public and philosophers alike since it
was first espoused in The Prince
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(1515/1947). Some passages from that
book are appropriate to illustrate the
types of moral considerations that
arise when a thoroughly relativistic
position on truth is adopted by
individuals who are in a position to
establish contingencies for the behav-
ior of others (e.g., politicians, behav-
ior therapists, and teachers).
Niccolo` Machiavelli was born in
Florence, Italy, in 1469. He served as
a diplomat for the city and in this role
observed the behavior of Italy’s most
effective leaders. These observations
became the basis for his treatise on
political philosophy. Specifically, Ma-
chiavelli had noted one flaw from
which all failing leaders suffered; in-
flexibility in the face of changing
times. In other words, in changing
times, staunch moral principles were
a leader’s Achilles’ heel. According to
Machiavelli, leaders can be more
successful at maintaining power if they
accommodate their personalities to the
exigencies of the times. Moreover,
whereas traditional Italian leaders
tried to curtail their lust for material
wealth and prestige, Machiavelli
preached the acquisition of personal
glory and riches. Previous rulers and
such statesmen as Cicero had equated
the practical with the moral, arguing
that expediency in political affairs
should never conflict with moral
matters. Machiavelli, in contrast, crit-
icized traditional humanism by sug-
gesting that a leader who wishes to
reach his goals will sometimes find it
necessary to behave immorally. In fact
he stated that any attempt to develop
an inflexible moral code for conduct
would be a ruinously irrational policy.
When questioned about whether or
not a leader will be answerable to
some deity or to their own conscience,
Machiavelli remained silent. Q. Skin-
ner (1996) commented that Machia-
velli’s ‘‘silence is eloquent, indeed
epoch making; it echoed around
Christian Europe, at first eliciting
a stunned silence in return, and then
a howl of execration that has never
finally died away’’ (p. 42).
Many challenged Machiavelli to
suggest how leaders were to conduct
themselves if not in accordance with
moral guidelines. To this Machiavelli
replied that a wise leader will be
guided above all by the dictates of
necessity. Moreover he must always
be ready to act in any way necessary
to obtain his personal goals. To create
consistency between his radically rel-
ativistic ideas on truth and morals
and the public’s desire for princely
virtue, Machiavelli simply altered the
traditional meaning of virtu´ for
princely behavior. Specifically, where-
as virtu´ previously referred to the
cardinal virtues, Machiavelli used this
term to refer to the behavior of any
leader who is willing to betray these
very virtues to get whatever it is he
seeks, usually power and riches. Thus,
the truly virtuous prince will do
whatever is dictated by necessity; the
ends always justify the means. In-
terestingly, this move parallels the
functional contextualistic stance on
truth in which truth has been defined
as the correlation between action and
the achievement of personal (and
optionally private) goals.
Machiavellianism and functional
contextualism also share the arguably
regrettable feature that they create
unbridgeable intellectual gulfs be-
tween themselves and the traditions
from which they have arisen (i.e.,
humanism and radical behaviorism,
respectively). More specifically, it has
been noted by functional contextua-
listic writers that differences in per-
sonal philosophy between traditional
radical behaviorists and functional
contextualists may render communi-
cation on research findings and the-
oretical developments difficult or
impossible. This problem arises be-
cause the traditional radical behav-
iorist may not always appreciate the
infinite flexibility of the contextual-
ist’s theoretical perspective (Barnes-
Holmes & Barnes-Holmes, 2000),
methodology (Barnes & Roche,
1994), and view of the nature of
psychological phenomena (Hayes et
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al., 1999). Similarly, Machiavelli de-
clared that his new code of conduct
had created an irreparable schism
between humanism and Machiavel-
lianism that he was neither capable of
nor interested in bridging (see Q.
Skinner, 1996). The emergence of this
gulf is particularly ironic given that
the contextualistic stance within be-
havior analysis has emerged directly
from radical behaviorism and the
shared emphasis on the individual
organism and the role of the scientist
in analysis. Just as Machiavellians are
free to use their philosophy for good
or ill, contextualists are free to behave
in ways that appear moral to some
and immoral to others. The impor-
tant point, however, is that at no time
are contextualists or Machiavellians
ultimately accountable to the wider
community, and both have commen-
ted on their commitment to this state
of affairs. It is worth repeating that
although this stance on moral ac-
countability does not suggest moral
disrepute, these issues appear to merit
consideration within a community of
scientists whose endeavor is the bet-
terment of the lot of others. It is
simply not good enough to note that
the peer review and publication pro-
cess will ultimately unearth morally
unacceptable behavior on the part of
scientists, even though this is almost
certainly the case. The community
deserves a level basis on which to
discuss the various agendas of differ-
ent research programs, not just the
immediate moral content of individ-
ual studies. The former may be
elucidated quickly through open dis-
cussion; the second will typically
emerge slowly after an unacceptable
research program has already made
its impact (e.g., politically motivated
research into race and intelligence).
We believe that it is time for
behavior analysts to consider serious-
ly where we as a community stand on
relativism and to discuss openly and
thoroughly the criteria we will use in
adopting ethical principles for our
community (other than the generic
codes of ethics provided by national
organizations such as the American
Psychological Association to which
only our North American members
submit). Without such a discussion it
is difficult to see how we can provide
the appropriate verbal contingencies
to produce scientific behavior appro-
priate to our community in therapeu-
tic and academic contexts. What is
needed, in effect, is a discussion of
how we, as a community, can make
valued ethical decisions and use them
as guides to scientific action.
COMMUNITY VALUES AS
GUIDES TO ACTION AND
SCIENTIFIC DECISION MAKING
The role of values and the status of
moral accountability in behavior
analysis are complex issues. Radical
behaviorism and its recent offspring,
functional contextualism, are philos-
ophies of science that hold very
different stances on the nature and
function of values in behavior-ana-
lytic practices. The implications of
these philosophical differences for
our field are broad and important.
A detailed discussion of these is
beyond the scope of this paper, but
our immediate concern is twofold:
first, to consider general ways in
which values can influence practi-
tioners and scientists, particularly as
guides to action and decision making,
and second, to summarize the poten-
tial of our value systems as guides to
action for behavior analysts.
Let us briefly examine an illustra-
tion from the feminist research tradi-
tion to point out the confluence of
science and political values. Scientific
knowing does not evolve in a cultural
vacuum. The structuring of scientific
knowing takes place within social and
cultural contexts that include individ-
ual and group preferences about what
ought to be. Longino (1989) refers to
these personal, social, and cultural
influences as contextual values, and
she reminds us that the rules of
evidence of scientific inquiry are not
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adequate to screen out their influence.
Although a scientist can make explicit
value commitments and still produce
good science, our focus should be on
examining the assumptions scientists
actually hold when they decide be-
tween conflicting generalizations
(Potter, 1988). Let us consider as an
example Longino’s collaborative
work with biologist Ruth Doell. Part
of their work (Longino & Doell,
1983) has been to critique theories of
hormonal influence and determina-
tion of gender-role behavior that
assume only two genders in the
designation of appropriate and in-
appropriate behaviors for male and
female children. Longino and Doell
admit to a political commitment that
presupposes a certain understanding
of human behavior and ‘‘when faced
with a conflict between these commit-
ments and a particular model of
brain-behavior relationships, we al-
low the political commitment to guide
the choice’’ (Longino, 1989, p. 53). It
is important to stress that the adopted
values-driven models will determine
the relevance and interpretation of
the data, not the other way around.
When scientific knowing is conceived
as participating in a social context,
objectivity has to be viewed as a func-
tion of the communal structure of
scientific inquiry rather than merely
a property of the behavior of the
individual scientist.
Values and Scientific Decision
Making in Behavior Analysis
For B. F. Skinner, moral and
ethical issues refer to the customs of
groups, and the main effect of
a culture is to bring the individual
under the control of remote conse-
quences of behavior. This effect has
survival value, and science plays a key
role in producing it, and in enabling
us to predict the survival value of
cultural practices. As Skinner put it,
‘‘survival is the ultimate criterion’’
(1956, p. 36), and recommendations
for what we ought to do follow from
this analysis. Skinner (1971) stressed
that these must be accompanied by
justification in the form of empirical
evidence of relevant controlling con-
tingencies (see also Day, 1977; Leig-
land, 1993). As we have seen, the
problem with cultural survival as the
ultimate value and criterion for de-
cision making is that we cannot distill
adequate rules for deciding from the
available courses of action.
In contrast to radical behaviorism,
functional contextualism takes a rad-
ical position on pragmatic truth and
the role of personal values in its
establishment. This position shifts
the criterion from publicly observable
effective action to the fulfillment of
value-based personal goals. The lat-
ter, in turn, are indefensible and
entitled to remain private. Unlike
the radical behaviorist, the contextu-
alist has no obligation to provide
empirical justification for recom-
mendations derived from a research
program once analytic goals are
achieved, and no accountability to
either the scientific community or the
community at large is necessary as
a rule. The primacy of the individual
scientist working in the context of
personal private values without ac-
countability to others (except when
chosen for personal purposes, such as
survival as a research scientist) opens
the possibility for a science that is
anticommunitarian and in which the
individual scientist can legitimately
seek only his or her own welfare.
JOHN DEWEY AND
PHILOSOPHICAL
PRAGMATISM: PARALLELS
AND POSSIBILITIES FOR
PRODUCTIVE INTERPLAY
Although radical behaviorism and
functional contextualism offer dispa-
rate approaches to values, behavior
analysts in both traditions are com-
mitted to a pragmatic goal orienta-
tion and stance on truth, and the
alignment of behavior analysis with
pragmatism has been widely noted
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(e.g., Baum, 1994; Day, 1977; Hayes
& Brownstein, 1986; Lamal, 1983;
Morris, 1993; Schneider, 1997). In
keeping with Day and Moore’s
(1995) recommendation that behav-
iorists engage in productive interplay
with philosophical accounts, we look
to Dewey (1958), one of the three
founders of philosophical pragma-
tism, whose work may be particularly
helpful to behavior analysts (Schnei-
der, 1997).
As a leading figure in American
functionalism, Dewey drew heavily
from Darwinian theory and focused
on familiar themes of adaptation,
coping, and survival. These are
themes behaviorists readily recognize
as central to B. F. Skinner’s discus-
sions of behavioral functions as well
as values. Skinner’s approach to
ethical problems reaches back to the
work of Dewey and Ralph Barton
Perry on naturalistic ethical philoso-
phy (Day, 1977), and both Dewey
and Skinner rejected the fact–value
dualism often assumed in ethical
inquiry. Dewey and Skinner shared
a passion for social issues and a com-
mitment to promoting progressive
cultural practices with a view towards
a better future. The role of science in
this endeavor was important to both.
Dewey makes note of what we stand
to lose if we fail to look to science for
direction:
Since scientific methods simply exhibit free
intelligence operating in the best manner
available at a given time, the cultural waste,
confusion and distortion that results from the
failure to use these methods, in all fields in
connection with all problems, is incalculable.
(cited in Putnam & Putnam, 1990, p. 407)
Dewey’s message will likely remind
behavior analysts that over the years,
and to the end, B. F. Skinner (1990)
made it clear that hope for the long-
term survival of our species rests on
scientific inquiry:
We see the continuing evolution of the culture
we call science. Scientists are discovering more
and more about the future consequences of
what we are doing. … If what can be known
about the future [were to become] part of the
history of enough people, the earth may last
a longer time. (p. 105)
The relevance of Dewey’s work for
our present discussion can be most
clearly appreciated if we consider his
orienting assumptions about commu-
nity and scientific inquiry. Dewey’s
views on the relational and communal
structure of scientific inquiry have
been likened to those of contempo-
rary feminists (Heldke, 1987; Rorty,
1999; Ruiz, 2001). His sense of
community reflects the influence of
evolutionary principles in that he
emphasized pluralism and the impor-
tance of creating maximal conditions
for individual variation within
groups. The highest source of author-
ity in Dewey’s community is agree-
ment reached by members through
free (nonforceful, noncoercive) and
open discussion. Dewey’s inclusive
community is focused on making the
future better than the present, but for
Dewey, survival included bringing as
many others along as possible. We
should recall that Skinner also recog-
nized the benefits of cultural plural-
ism (see Ruiz, 1995), and he warned
that ‘‘a culture which made people as
much alike as possible might slip into
a standard pattern from which there
would be no escape’’ (1971, p. 162).
Rorty (1999) characterizes Dewey as
an antiauthoritarian philosopher of
human freedom (as in noncoercion)
and social justice devoted to utopian
social hope, and ‘‘the most useful and
most significant figure in twentieth-
century philosophy’’ (p. 49). As
a pragmatist, Dewey of course un-
derstood that what is good for one
person or group to believe may not be
good for another person or group.
Dewey’s strategy was to avoid the
topic of truth and talk instead of
justification (see Lamal, 1983) in both
science and morals. Rorty explains
that Dewey, and pragmatists in gen-
eral,
see scientific inquiry not as aimed at truth, but
rather at better justificatory ability—better to
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deal with doubts about what we are saying,
either by shoring up what we have previously
said or by deciding to say something different.
The trouble with aiming at truth is that you
would not know when you’ve reached it. But
you aim at ever more justification, the
assuagement of ever more doubt. Analogous-
ly, you cannot aim at ‘‘doing what is right,’’
because you will never know whether you
have hit the mark. Long after you are dead,
better informed and more sophisticated people
may judge your actions to have been a tragic
mistake, just as they may judge your scientific
beliefs as intelligible only by reference to an
obsolete paradigm. … Scientific progress is
a matter of integrating more and more data
into a coherent web of belief. … Moral
progress is a matter of wider and wider
sympathy. (pp. 81–82)
As behavior analysts endeavor to
build a coherent system from which
to promote effective cultural prac-
tices, we recognize that as pragma-
tists we are not searching for solu-
tions that are ultimately ‘‘true’’ or
‘‘right.’’ We are instead making
decisions about the best possible
courses of effective action. When
the decision is difficult because the
case is not clear-cut, we may do well
to recall Dewey’s notion of commu-
nity. Echoing this notion, Leigland
(2003) reminds us that as pragma-
tists, ‘‘we have the shared [italics
added] goals of being part of a scien-
tific community’’ (p. 303) to rely on.
We may also want to turn to Dewey
as one of the leading figures in the
pragmatist tradition as we attempt to
establish an acceptable means of
deciding on moral matters. Dewey
suggests that we seek wider sympathy
through dialogue rather than narrow-
ing the context of debate to the
solitary individual or scientist work-
ing towards personal private goals. A
strong participatory research tradi-
tion already exists within behavior
analysis, and many will recognize
Dewey’s notion of community re-
flected in the research model built
by behavior analysts who work in
community psychology and action
research (Fawcett, 1991; Fawcett,
Fletcher, & Mathews, 1980; Fawcett,
Francisco, & Schultz, 2004; Jason &
Glenwick, 1980; Johnson & Geller,
1980)
CONCLUSION
It might be useful for behavior
analysts, particularly practitioners
who must make recommendations
for the improvement of cultural
practices affecting people’s lives, to
consider adopting these Deweyian
orienting assumptions about commu-
nity and the communal aspects of
inquiry. Blueprints for this approach
are already available in the work of
behavior analysts who work in com-
munity psychology (see Fawcett,
1991). Dewey’s inclusive community
requires members to reach agreement
through free and open discussion and
can therefore contemplate crosscul-
tural dialogue. This stands in sharp
contrast to isolated communities and
cultures that struggle individually for
survival. Dewey’s emphasis on plu-
ralism rejects excluding particulars
from the multiplicity of ‘‘goods’’
without first engaging in strenuous
effort at understanding the perspec-
tive of the ‘‘other.’’ In contrast to
closed communities fighting for sur-
vival, cooperative dialogue can lead
to open communities that broaden
themselves in the process.
Orienting assumptions compatible
with Dewey’s are held by numerous
scientists within the feminist scientific
community, many members of which
share a pragmatic goal orientation
with behavior analysts (Ruiz, 1995,
1998). Feminists stress that scientific
activity is a means to achieving
solutions to practical problems, and
as such it is also political activity.
Although communal consensus is not
a logical requirement for establishing
the scientific validity of pragmatic
truth, political activity, whether in
the form of scientific or activist
practices, requires community and
consensus building. Indeed, Rorty
(1982) reminds us that once a prag-
matic line is adopted, there are two
possible ways to go. Following De-
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wey, we can emphasize the moral
importance of behavioral science and
its role in widening and deepening
our sense of community and the
possibilities open to our own com-
munity. Or, following postmodernist
Michel Foucalt, we can emphasize
behavioral science as an instrument
of domination. Rorty sees the dis-
tinction between Focault’s ‘‘knowl-
edge as power’’ and Dewey’s ‘‘knowl-
edge as human solidarity’’ as
a distinction over what we may hope
for our science, our culture, and
ourselves. We offer the foregoing
thoughts in the hopes that they will
stimulate further discussion about
our community’s aspirational goals,
our values, and our visions for the
future of behavior analysis.
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